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Abstract: We consider a monopolistic firm producing a good while polluting and 
using a fossil energy. This firm can adopt a clean technology by incurring an 
investment cost decreasing exponentially with the adoption date.  This clean 
technology does not pollute and has a lower production cost because it uses a 
renewable energy. We determine the optimal adoption date for the firm in the cases 
where it is regulated at each period of time and when it is not regulated. 
Interestingly, the regulated firm adopts the clean technology earlier than what is 
socially-optimal. However, the non-regulated firm adopts later than what is socially 
desired. The regulator can compensate the regulated firm for the loss incurred if he 
wants that it delays its adoption date to the socially-optimal one. Nevertheless, the 
regulator may be interested in letting the firm adopts earlier to encourage the 
diffusion of the use of green technologies in other industries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Encouraging the use of renewable energy, such as solar energy or wind energy, in 
place of fossil energy is one of the most stimulating debates of the recent years. 
Indeed, countries are more conscious that fossil energy is becoming scarce and they 
are now experiencing the effects of climate change. Moreover, petrol multinationals 
have gained too much money in the last decade and are now ready to invest in the 
promotion of renewable energies. 
Dosi and Moretto (1997) studied the regulation of a firm which can switch to a 
green technology by incurring an irreversible investment cost. This technological 
switch is expected to provide benefits surrounded, however, by a certain degree of 
uncertainty. To bridge the gap between the private and the policy-maker’s desired 
timing of innovation, they recommended that the regulator should stimulate the 
innovation by subsidies and by reducing the uncertainty surrounding the 
profitability of the new technology through appropriate announcements. Soest (2005) 
analyzed the impact of environmental taxes and quotas on the timing of adoption 
when the rate at which improved energy-efficient technologies become available is 
uncertain, and when the investment decision is irreversible. He found that neither 
policy instrument is unambiguously preferred to the other. Nasiri and Zaccour (2009) 
proposed a game-theoretic approach to model and analyze the process of utilizing 
biomass for power generation. They considered three players: distributor, facility 
developer, and participating farmer. They characterized the subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium and discussed its features. Ben Youssef (2010) considered a monopolistic 
firm that can adopt a cleaner technology within a finite time by incurring an 
investment cost. He showed that the socially-optimal adoption date of incomplete 
information is delayed with respect to the complete information one.    
Whitehead and Cherry (2007) estimated the annual benefits of the regional 
amenities associated with a green energy program in North Carolina. Varun, Prakash 
and Bhat (2009) found that wind and small hydro are the most sustainable source for 
the electricity generation. Li et al. (2009) estimated how much US households would 
be willing to pay annually to support increased energy R&D activities designed to 
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replace fossil fuels. Caspary (2009) assessed the likely competitiveness of different 
forms of renewable energy in Colombia over the next 25 years. The key conclusion is 
that while solar Photovoltaic (PV) will likely remain uncompetitive under any future 
cost scenario, cost paths for small hydro, modern biomass or geothermal are already 
close enough to being competitive. Thus, appropriate government intervention may 
make the decisive difference in making these technologies competitive with 
conventional energy technologies. Pillai and Banerjee (2009) reviewed the status and 
potential of different renewables (except biomass) in India and have established a 
diffusion model as a basis for setting targets.  
The most important features of this work is that the clean technology has a lower 
production cost than the polluting one. Moreover, we compare the socially-optimal 
adoption date to the optimal one for the instantaneous regulated and non-regulated 
firm.  
We consider a monopolistic firm producing a good using a dirty (polluting) 
technology. We can think about a producer of electricity like société tunisienne 
d’éléctricité et du gaz (STEG) which has a monopoly power of producing and 
distributing electricity in Tunisia. This polluting production uses fossil energy. This 
firm can adopt a clean technology within a finite time by incurring an investment 
cost decreasing exponentially as the adoption is delayed. The new and green 
production technology is characterized by no pollution emission and by a lower 
production cost because it uses a renewable energy. We consider the situation where 
the firm is regulated at each period of time by an emission-tax when it uses the dirty 
technology, and by a production subsidy when it uses the green technology. We also 
consider the situation where the monopoly is not regulated. 
Surprisingly, the regulated firm adopts the green technology in a finite time and 
earlier than what is socially desired. The regulator can compensate the firm for the 
losses incurred so that it delays its adoption to the socially-optimal adoption date. 
Nonetheless, the non-regulated firm adopts the clean technology in a finite time but 
later than what is socially desired.  
Indeed, when the regulated firm switch to the green technology, it no longer pays a 
pollution tax, receives a production subsidy and its production cost decrease. 
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Consequently, its instantaneous net profit increases importantly and that’s why it 
adopts the clean technology very soon. In the same time, the instantaneous social 
welfare level increases because there are no environmental damages and production 
costs are lower. However, this instantaneous benefit of society from the green 
technology is less important than that of the firm. For this reason the firm adopts the 
clean technology earlier than what is socially optimal. When the non-regulated firm 
adopts the green technology, its production cost decreases. Consequently, its 
instantaneous net profit increases, but not importantly, and less than the increase of 
the instantaneous social welfare. Thus, the adoption date of the non-regulated firm is 
higher than what is socially desired. 
Our main result contradicts with the one in Ben Youssef (2010) where, because of 
the positive marginal social cost of public funds, the instantaneous net profit of the 
regulated firm is nil, and that’s why the firm never adopts the cleaner technology 
unless it receives an innovation subsidy. Also, in Dosi and Moretto (1997), the 
regulator objective is the abandonment of the polluting technology and adoption of 
the green one before a ‘’critical’’ date, whereas in the present paper the regulator 
maximizes his intertemporal social welfare function. Moreover, they have not 
considered the case where the firm is instantaneously regulated. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 
studies the instantaneous regulated firm and Section 4 studies the non-regulated 
firm. In Section 5, we derive the optimal adoption dates and compare them. Section 6 
concludes and an Appendix contains some proofs.  
 
2. The model 
 
We consider a monopolistic firm producing a good in quantity q sold on the 
market at price p(q)=a-bq, a,b>0. 
The consumption of this good gives a consumer surplus equal to 
2
0 2
)()()( qbqqpdzzpqCS q =−= ∫ . 
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At the beginning of the game i.e. at date 0, the firm uses an old and polluting 
production technology using fossil fuels and characterized by a positive 
emission/output ratio e>0. 
Therefore, the pollution emitted by the firm is E=eq, which causes damages to the 
environment equal to D=αE, where α>0 is the marginal disutility of pollution. Let us 
point out here that we suppose that damages caused to the environment are due to 
the flow of emissions and not to the stock of pollution. 
With the polluting technology, the unit production cost is d>0 and the profit of the 
firm1 is dqqqpd −=Π )( . 
The firm behaves for an infinite horizon of time and can adopt a new and clean 
production technology within a period of time τ. This clean technology does not 
pollute at all, uses a renewable energy (solar energy for instance) and therefore has a 
lower unit production cost c verifying 0<c<d. Thus, the profit of the firm is   
.)( cqqqpc −=Π
 
An investment cost is necessary to get the new technology. This investment cost 
could comprise the R&D cost and/or the cost of acquisition and installation of the 
green technology. Thus, we will use the terms innovation and adoption 
interchangeably.  
The cost of adopting the clean technology at date τ actualized at date 0 is: 
τθτ mreV −=)( ,                                                              (1) 
where θ>0 is the cost of immediate adoption of the green technology, r>0 is the 
discount rate, and m>1 denotes that the cost of innovation decreases more rapidly 
when m is greater. 
Function V is decreasing because of the existence of freely-available scientific 
research enabling the firm to reduce the cost of innovation when it delays its 
adoption, and is convex because the R&D cost increases more rapidly when the firm 
tries to accelerate the adoption date. Let’s remark that τ=+∞ means that the firm 
never innovates. 
                                                          
1 In what follows, the subscripts d and c will refer to the dirty (polluting) and clean technologies, 
respectively.  
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3. Regulated firm 
 
 In this section, we study the case where the firm is regulated at each period of 
time. Rather than directly looking to the socially-optimal regulatory instruments, we 
will determine the socially-optimal production quantities. Next, we determine the 
regulatory instruments. 
When the firm uses the dirty technology, the instantaneous social welfare is: 
)()()( qqDqCSS dd Π+−=                                                   (2) 
Maximizing the expression given by (2) with respect to q gives the socially-optimal 
production level with the polluting technology: 
b
edaqd
α−−
=ˆ                                                              (3) 
We assume the following condition so that production quantities are positive: 
eda α+>                                                                (4) 
Therefore, the maximum willingness to pay for the good must be higher than the 
marginal cost of production plus the marginal damage of production. 
Since the firm is a polluting monopoly, it is regulated. An emission-tax per-unit of 
pollution t is sufficient to induce the socially-optimal level of production. 
Indeed, the instantaneous net profit of the firm is: 
)()( qtEqU dd −Π=                                                       (5) 
The socially-optimal per-unit emission-tax that induces the firm to produce dqˆ  is: 
e
qbda
t d
ˆ2−−
=                                                          (6) 
Using the expression of dqˆ , we can show that: 
edat α20 +<⇔>                                                     (7) 
Therefore, the emission-tax is positive when the marginal damage of pollution is 
high enough. Otherwise, it is negative meaning that the regulator subsidizes 
production to deal with the monopoly distortion.  
When the firm uses the clean technology, the instantaneous social welfare is: 
)()( qqCSS cc Π+=                                                     (8) 
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Maximizing the expression given by (8) with respect to q gives the socially-optimal 
production level with the green technology: 
b
caqc
−
=ˆ                                                              (9) 
It is to verify that dc qq ˆˆ > . Therefore, the clean technology enables to produce 
more and without pollution.  
Since the monopoly has tendency to under-produce, it is regulated by a subsidy 
per-unit of production s to induce the socially-optimal level of production. 
Indeed, the instantaneous net profit of the firm is: 
sqqU cc +Π= )(                                                       (10) 
The socially-optimal per-unit subsidy that induces the firm to produce cqˆ  is: 
acqbs c −+= ˆ2                                                       (11) 
Using the expression of cqˆ , we can show that s>0. 
 
4. Non-regulated firm 
 
In this section, we will study the case where the monopoly is not regulated even 
when it uses the dirty technology. 
When it uses the old technology, the firm maximizes it profit dΠ  to get the optimal 
level of production: 2 
b
daqnd 2
−
=                                                        (12) 
When it uses the green technology, the firm maximizes it profit cΠ  to get the 
optimal level of production: 
b
caqnc 2
−
=                                                        (13) 
It is easy to verify that the firm produces more with the clean technology because 
of its lower production cost ( )ndnc qq > . 
We can establish that: 
                                                          
2 The superscript n refers to the non-regulation case.   
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edaqq ndd α2ˆ >−⇔>                                               (14) 
Indeed, with the polluting technology, the socially-optimal production takes into 
account both environmental damages and the monopoly distortion, and is higher 
than the monopoly level only when the marginal damage is low enough. However, 
with the clean technology, there is no pollution, and we always have ncc qq >ˆ  as it is 
commonly known.  
 
5. Optimal adoption dates 
 
 The intertemporal social welfare, intertemporal net profit of the regulated firm 
and non-regulated firm are, respectively: 
τ
τ
τ
θ mrrtccrtdd edteqSdteqSIS −
+∞
−−
−+= ∫∫ )ˆ()ˆ(0                               (15) 
τ
τ
τ
θ mrrtccrtdd edteqUdteqUIU −
+∞
−−
−+= ∫∫ )ˆ()ˆ(0                            (16) 
τ
τ
τ
θ mrrtnccrtndd
n
edteqdteqIU −
+∞
−−
−Π+Π= ∫∫ )()(0                          (17) 
In order to have positive adoption dates, we need the following condition, which 
can be always verified by choosing θ and/or m high enough: 
mrqUqU ddcc θ<− )ˆ()ˆ(                                                      (18) 
The regulator and the firm maximize their intertemporal payoff functions with 
respect to τ to get the optimal adoption date. In the Appendix, we determine the 
socially-optimal adoption date, the optimal adoption date for the regulated firm and 
for the non-regulated firm, which are respectively: 
0)ˆ()ˆ(ln)1(
1
ˆ >




 −
−
=
mr
qSqS
rm
ddcc
θ
τ
                                        
  (19) 
0)ˆ()ˆ(ln)1(
1* >




 −
−
=
mr
qUqU
rm
ddcc
θ
τ
                                        (20)                                            
0
)()(
ln)1(
1* >







 Π−Π
−
=
mr
qq
rm
n
dd
n
ccn
θ
τ
                                      (21)  
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Proposition 1. We have the following ranking for the optimal adoption dates: 
**
ˆ0 nτττ <<<                                                             (22) 
Therefore, the optimal adoption date for the regulated firm is earlier than the socially-optimal 
one. However, the optimal adoption date for the non-regulated firm is later than the socially-
optimal one. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
The above results are due to the fact that the incentives to innovate are, in order, 
greater for the regulated firm, the society and the non-regulated firm. This is clearly 
established by the inequalities in (29). Indeed, when the regulated firm uses the clean 
technology, its instantaneous net profit importantly increases because it no longer 
pays a pollution tax, receives a production subsidy and has a lower production cost. 
Consequently, the regulated firm adopts the green technology very early. For the 
society, the clean technology prevents environmental damages and reduces 
production costs. That’s why adoption is socially desired. The non-regulated firm has 
less incentive because the unique advantage of the new technology is the reduction 
of its unit production cost. Nonetheless, the non-regulated firm adopts the green 
technology within a finite time. 
Paradoxically, if the regulator desires that the regulated firm delays its adoption to 
the socially-optimal adoption date, he has to compensate the firm for the losses it 
incurs by this delay of adoption. 
If the intertemporal net profits of the regulated firm are )( *τIU and )ˆ(τIU when the 
adoption dates are *τ  and τˆ , respectively, then the innovation subsidy 
(compensation) is: 
0)ˆ()( * >−= ττ IUIUg                                                       (23) 
 
Proposition 2. The regulator can push the regulated firm to delay its adoption of the clean 
technology by giving it an innovation subsidy that compensates the firm for the losses it  
incur when it delays its optimal adoption date to the socially-optimal one. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we consider a monopolistic firm producing a good using a dirty 
technology. However, this firm can adopt a clean technology within a finite time by 
incurring an investment cost decreasing exponentially as the adoption is delayed. 
The green production technology is characterized by no pollution emission and by a 
lower production cost because it uses a renewable energy. We consider the situation 
where the firm is regulated at each period of time by an emission-tax when it uses 
the dirty technology, and by a production subsidy when it uses the green one. We 
also consider the situation where the monopoly is not regulated. 
When the regulated firm switch to the green technology, it no longer pays a 
pollution tax, receives a production subsidy and its unit production cost decrease. 
Consequently, its instantaneous net profit increases significantly. In the same time, 
the instantaneous social welfare level increases because there are no environmental 
damages and production costs are lower. However, this instantaneous benefit of 
society from the green technology is less important than that of the firm. When the 
non-regulated firm adopts the green technology, its unit production cost decreases. 
Consequently, its instantaneous net profit increases, but not importantly, and less 
than the increase of the instantaneous social welfare. From these results we deduce 
the following. 
The non-regulated firm adopts the clean technology in a finite time but later than 
what is socially-optimal. Interestingly, the regulated firm adopts the green 
technology in a finite time and earlier than what is socially desired. The regulator can 
compensate the firm for the losses incurred if he desires that the firm delays its 
adoption to the socially-optimal adoption date. However, the regulator may be 
interested in letting the firm adopts earlier to encourage the diffusion of the use of 
clean technologies in other industries.  
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Appendix 
 
A) Instantaneous gains from the green technology 
* dddccdddcc qeqcdqqcqq
b
aqSqS ˆˆ)()ˆˆ()ˆˆ(
2
)ˆ()ˆ( α+−+−



−+−=−  
By using the expressions of dqˆ  and cqˆ , the above bracketed expression is equal to
.
2
ecd α+−
 Therefore, we have: 
 0)ˆˆ(
2
)ˆ()ˆ( >++−=− dcddcc qq
ecdqSqS α                                       (24) 
* [ ] ddcdcdcddcc qteqdqcsqqqqbaqUqU ˆˆˆ)()ˆˆ()ˆˆ()ˆ()ˆ( ++−+−+−=−  
By changing the emission tax t and the production subsidy s by their expressions in 
function of dqˆ   and cqˆ , we obtain: 
0)ˆˆ()ˆ()ˆ( 22 >−=− dcddcc qqbqUqU                                               (25) 
* [ ] ncndndncndncnddncc cqdqqqqqbaqq −+−+−=Π−Π )()()()(  
By replacing ncq  and 
n
dq  between the above brackets by their values, we get: 
0)(
2
)()( >+−=Π−Π ndncnddncc qq
cdqq
                                (26)
 
Therefore, the clean technology improves the instantaneous social welfare when 
production levels are the socially-optimal ones. It also increases the instantaneous net 
profit of both the regulated firm and non-regulated firm. 
 
B) Comparison of the instantaneous gains 
*By using expressions (24) and (25), we have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dcdcddccddcc qqecdqqbqSqSqUqU ˆˆ2ˆˆ)ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ( +


 +−
−−=−−−
α
 
By using the expressions of dqˆ  and cqˆ  in the above bracketed expression, we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0ˆˆ
2
)ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ( >++−=−−− dcddccddcc qq
ecdqSqSqUqU α
               (27)
 
*By using expressions (24) and (26), we get: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
[ ] ( )dcndncdc
n
d
n
cdc
n
dd
n
ccddcc
qqeqqqqcd
qqcdqqecdqqqSqS
ˆˆ
2
ˆˆ
2
2
ˆˆ
2
)()()ˆ()ˆ(
++−−+
−
=
+
−
−+
+−
=Π−Π−−
α
α
 
By replacing dqˆ  , ,ˆcq
n
cq  and 
n
dq  by their values in the above brackets, we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( )dcnddnccddcc qqeb edcacdqqqSqS ˆˆ22 222)()()ˆ()ˆ( ++ −−−−=Π−Π−− αα  
Using condition (4) for the above bracketed term gives: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0ˆˆ
24
)()()()ˆ()ˆ(
2
>++
−
>Π−Π−− dc
n
dd
n
ccddcc qq
e
b
cdqqqSqS α
              (28) 
Thus, we have the following ranking: 
)ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()()(0 ddccddccnddncc qUqUqSqSqq −<−<Π−Π<
                   
(29) 
The instantaneous gain from using the clean technology is greater for the regulated 
firm than for the society, which benefits more than the non-regulated firm.  
 
C) Optimal adoption dates 
*To get the socially-optimal adoption date, the regulator maximizes his 
intertemporal social welfare function given by (15) with respect to τ: 
( ) 0)ˆ()ˆ( =+−=
∂
∂
−− ττ θ
τ
mrr
ccdd mreeqSqS
IS
                                 (30) 
Equation (30) is equivalent to: 
⇔=+− − 0)ˆ()ˆ( )1( τθ rmccdd mreqSqS 




 −
−
=
mr
qSqS
rm
ddcc
θ
τ
)ˆ()ˆ(ln)1(
1
ˆ                 (31) 
Because of m>1, condition (18) and inequality (29), 0ˆ >τ . 
We have: ( ) ττ θ
τ
mrr
ddcc emreqSqSr
IS
−−
−−=
∂
∂ 2
2
2
)()ˆ()ˆ( . 
Using the first order condition given by (30), we get: 
0)1()ˆ( ˆ22
2
<−=
∂
∂
− τθ
τ
τ mrermm
IS
 
The second order condition of optimality is verified. 
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*The regulated firm maximizes its intertemporal net profit given by (16) with respect 
to τ: 
( ) 0)ˆ()ˆ( =+−=
∂
∂
−− ττ θ
τ
mrr
ccdd mreeqUqU
IU
                                 (32) 
Equation (32) is equivalent to: 
⇔=+− − 0)ˆ()ˆ( )1( τθ rmccdd mreqUqU 




 −
−
=
mr
qUqU
rm
ddcc
θ
τ
)ˆ()ˆ(ln)1(
1*              (33) 
Because of m>1 and inequality (18), 0* >τ . 
We have: ( ) ττ θ
τ
mrr
ddcc emreqUqUr
IU
−−
−−=
∂
∂ 2
2
2
)()ˆ()ˆ( . 
Using the first order condition given by (32), we obtain: 
0)1()( *22
*2
<−=
∂
∂
− τθ
τ
τ mrermm
IU
 
Therefore, the second order condition of optimality is verified. 
* The non-regulated firm maximizes its intertemporal net profit given by (17) with 
respect to τ: 
( ) 0)()( =+Π−Π=
∂
∂
−− ττ θ
τ
mrrn
cc
n
dd
n
mreeqqIU                                  (34) 
The above equality implies: 
⇔=+Π−Π − 0)()( )1( τθ rmnccndd mreqq 






 Π−Π
−
=
mr
qq
rm
n
dd
n
ccn
θ
τ
)()(
ln)1(
1*           (35) 
Because of m>1, inequalities (18) and (29), 0* >nτ . 
We have: ( ) ττ θ
τ
mrrn
dd
n
cc
n
emreqqrIU −− −Π−Π=
∂
∂ 2
2
2
)()()( . 
Using the first order condition given by (34), we obtain: 
0)1()( *22
*2
<−=
∂
∂
−
n
mr
nn
ermm
IU τθ
τ
τ
 
The second order condition of optimality is verified. 
 
D) Comparison of the optimal dates 
Inequalities (29) and the fact that m>1,  enable us to make the following ranking: 
 14
**
ˆ0 nτττ <<<  
The regulated firm adopts sooner than what is socially desired, whereas the non-
regulated firm adopts later. 
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